Abstract: In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense-or conspire or assist in itbut nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management's role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm's reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding doctrine-including broadening of the presently narrow "responsible corporate officer" doctrine-so as to authorize such punishment do not fare well under the justificatory demands of criminal law theory. The principle obstacle to such arguments is the large industrial corporation itself, which necessarily entails kinds and degrees of delegation and risk-taking that do not fit well with settled concepts about mens rea and omission liability. Even the most egregious and harmful management failures must be addressed through design and regulation of the corporation rather than imposition of individual criminal liability.
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps not since the early twentieth century has there been so much outrage at large about the malfeasance of the large corporation, and particularly the relationship of senior managers to such conduct. The sentiment is understandable. In reckoning with the wrongs of the big business firm in one serious case after another, a responsibility gap has emerged.
1 The financial crisis of 2008 crystallized the problem, which has only repeated across many scandals since. shown to have directed fraud, just as in the mortgage-backed securities fiasco leading up to 2008 top managers of the mega-banks appear to have floated well above the details of how their derivatives traders executed any individual deals that might have crossed the line from ill-advised for the buyers to intentionally deceptive.
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There are many more such contemporary cases, of course. They are to be distinguished from those in which firms are smaller and top managers have their hands on operational details: Stewart Parnell, the CEO of the peanut company whose products killed people after he directed "ship it" in spite of lack of required safety testing; 6 or Donald Blankenship, the CEO of the coal company Massey Energy, whose obsessive efforts to limit the costs of the federal government's mine safety rules led to the explosion of the Upper Big Branch mine in West Virginia, killing nearly thirty workers.
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(Both men stand convicted, though neither of homicide.)
The case of concern here is the one of what we can call a responsibility gap-one in which conventional theories of criminal liability do not easily, or even under strain, satisfy understandable deterrent and retributive urges directed at corporate managers.
The problem in such cases arises structurally from, and is unique to, the large corporate institution. To ascribe criminal liability only at the "line" level of the workers on the ground-the GM switch engineer, the BP rig workers, the Wells Fargo branch officials-is not just to come up short in ascribing responsibility to all those who bear it.
The problem goes beyond that. There is a sense in the corporate context that if management created a corporate culture and a system of incentives that made the relevant conduct and ensuing harm likely or even inevitable, then the line workers-at least morally though not legally-have a kind of partial excuse. This is what is meant when people, including those who have sat on juries in several high-profile cases, say that the prosecution treated the low or mid-level worker as a "scapegoat." 8 It is not just that management is also responsible. It is that management appears to be more responsible.
Of course, the other fact generating the responsibility gap is that management is not present in such prosecutions for good reason: settled criminal law does not contain tools to punish this sort of thing. Managers in this type of case have mostly omitted to prevent another person's crime. And they have generally omitted to do so while lacking knowledge that wrongdoing was afoot. Neither act nor mental state, the loci to which criminal liability attaches, is present, at least not in most recognizable form.
In the context of criminal organizations, doctrines of conspiracy and accomplice liability, as well as specialized statutes such as RICO that address group criminality, deal effectively (some would say too effectively) with the role of the hands-off manager. But those tools work in that context only because of its factual texture: the thorough criminality of the organization's business plan makes it vastly easier to infer the mental state of managers with respect to the crimes of their underlings. Not so with the large legitimate business firm, in which the serious criminal episode, however disastrous, is an aberration in a project that overwhelmingly involves legal, indeed often intensely desired, behaviors. Former BP CEO Tony Hayward, in other words, was no Tony Soprano. The responsibility gap has long exerted pressure on the criminal law in corporate cases. The problem may be acute at present but it is not new. A twentieth century appreciation for harms associated with corporate production of goods, especially substances that enter bodies, long ago produced the peculiar doctrine of "responsible corporate officer" liability. 9 RCO, as I will call it, provides that in certain federal regulatory regimes-most prominently, the food and drug laws and the clean air and water laws-a corporate manager can be held criminally liable, at the misdemeanor level, if he stood in "responsible relation" to a violation of the law anywhere within the corporation, even if he did not act or advert with respect to the violation.
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RCO is not a solution to the responsibility gap. Even in current form it is objectionable, if perhaps bearable. But to make it a real solution for cases such as those we have discussed, legislators and judges would have to expand the doctrine into many other areas of federal regulation and criminal law. As crimes became more serious (felonies) and more intent-based (fraud, for example-the most commonly relevant crime in the financial sector), RCO would become more than a slightly embarrassing but circumscribed and perhaps tolerable exception to principles of individual fault. It would require a sea change in Anglo-American theories of punishment. Justification for such change, as we will see, is exceedingly hard to construct.
Corporate criminal liability is another mechanism by which American law attempts to close the responsibility gap. As I have argued elsewhere, in partial opposition to the power of the institution and human capacity to control it; the American dependence on these economic powerhouses and our resentment of their tendency to do us wrong.
Making it easier to use criminal law to punish corporate managers for wrongdoing within corporations might yield some additional deterrence, and perhaps some public satisfaction. But only at the cost of badly compromising principles of punishment, not to mention the potential for costly excessive deterrence. More to the point, the impulse to expand criminal liability for managers is not going to get us what we seem so badly to want: a humanizing of the corporation-a compression of this unwieldy legal and economic institution down to a size or into a form that appears amenable to control and punishment. For that, we would need to look outside the criminal law to the law and institutions that created the modern corporation in the first instance and that bear primary responsibility for its constitution and regulation.
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows. Part I documents and explains the responsibility gap. Part II shows why RCO, even in imagined new forms, cannot close the gap. Part III shows why corporate criminal liability also cannot close the gap. Part IV concludes by considering how we might think about the problem of corporate criminality outside of, and prior to, the criminal law-indeed, how we might think about it more ambitiously than the persistent impulse to imprison corporate managers has conceived of the problem.
I. THE RESPONSIBILITY GAP
To see the problem of the responsibility gap in corporate crime, let us consider three hypothetical cases. All three involve CEOs who bear some form of responsibility for serious cataclysms. Their jobs include many duties, but perhaps paramount among them are duties to ensure that the relevant events do not transpire on their watches. All three have the capacity to prevent what happens.
We can be sure that the three receive ample financial rewards for doing the CEO job, in all likelihood higher rewards than any others associated with their companies. That compensation, together with the CEO title, reflects in part the burden that is placed on them to worry about and prevent the most damaging things that can happen to firms in their particular industries. Beyond that, at least according to some intuitions, their lucrative pay differentiates them from most in society in terms of the quality of behavior others are entitled to expect of them. In other words, much is expected from those to whom much is given.
This account of CEO responsibility, which is only sketched here, is an account of serious moral fault. Especially if one believes harm is relevant to fault, the account involves the kind of reasoning that justifies consequences to a wrongdoer that are more than financial. Traditional principles of criminal law, however, do not permit the first two of our three CEOs to be held liable. They permit liability for the third only on an expansive account of punishment for negligence. All three cases present serious problems on the dimensions of both act and mental state.
Case 1: Albert is the CEO of a company that manufactures an industrial gas in a process including highly volatile chemicals, one of which is compound X. Albert thinks to himself one morning, "I know I'm supposed to go to work because I'm in charge of an important company but I'd rather play golf and drink scotch today, and perhaps tomorrow as well." As he does with some frequency, Albert eschews the office that day and goes to his country club where he plays eighteen holes and then has scotches with his REV. 547, 555 (1988) ("Given that contract and tort law is primarily compensatory, it would be absurd to suggest that every breach of a civilly imposed duty should also be criminally punished if that breach led to a criminally proscribed harm."). The Model Penal Code is puzzlingly oblivious to this problem, at least on the face of the Code and Commentaries. The Code qualifies for omission liability any duty "imposed by law," then says in the Explanatory Note that the "duty to perform the omitted act must have been otherwise imposed by law" with reference in an accompanying footnote to "a statutory duty, a contractual duty, or a duty arising from tort law." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.01(3) & Explanatory Note 3 (including n.30).
specify and cabin the managerial duty that could give rise to any theory of omission liability.
Albert's mens rea is also a legal problem. He certainly had no knowledge or intent with respect to his facility exploding. The tragedy was perhaps the last thing Albert wanted to see happen at his company. If, as his lassitude suggests, Albert was unaware of the existence of the faulty equipment at the facility, he also was not reckless because he did not consciously disregard the relevant risk.
Albert, then, was at most negligent in choosing to play golf and drink scotch rather than attend to his work. Any theory of negligence liability, however, must specify the relevant risk. It is not sufficient for criminal negligence to find that Albert, in playing hooky from work, failed to think about riskiness in the world or even riskiness in the entirety of his company's business-risk in the air, so to speak. One cannot be liable for being a negligent person; one must be found to have been negligent with respect to something, namely a specifiable risk.
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To hold Albert criminally liable in connection with the explosion of dangerous compound X, we must conclude: that Albert failed to advert to that risk; that the risk was both substantial (more facts needed perhaps) and unjustifiable (likely the case, though at least in part a question of cost-benefit analysis); and that Albert's failure to advert was a gross deviation from the conduct of the reasonable CEO. In other words, we must conclude not only that Albert should have gone to work more often but that, while there, he should have attended more to the matter of the equipment used to handle compound X.
This will depend on knowing more about the structure of Albert's company, industry standards, the presence of any warning signs of risk that Albert failed to notice, and so on. Suppose, for example, that Albert-in part to relax himself on the golf course-had recently hired a safety expert with a sterling reputation in the industry and told him, "Do your job, I don't need to know about anything you do unless it's a major cost item."
Albert might bear serious responsibility for the deaths-for example, because he could have done much more to monitor the expert's work-yet not fit even criminal negligence doctrine.
Then there is the additional problem of justifying punishment for negligence. Even if the risk of the explosion was substantial and unjustifiable, and Albert's failure to be aware of it was a gross deviation from the conduct of a reasonable CEO, does Albert deserve to go to prison for the deaths of the employees? Many members of the public undoubtedly will think so. But their intuitions will be driven in large part by the harm associated with Albert's negligence, a matter of what some would argue is largely irrelevant moral luck.
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One analytical view-perhaps reflected in the positive criminal law of most jurisdictions in the United States-would be that any punishment for negligence must be proportionately mild and that the moral luck factor cannot bootstrap a case of relatively minor culpability into a major one. The relevant statutes require a "scheme to defraud," which necessarily involves planning.
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The mens rea problem in Brad's case will be common to many, though certainly not all, cases of corporate crime. White collar crimes such as fraud, obstruction of justice, and bribery often require high levels of mens rea for liability-typically knowledge of certain facts plus specific forms of intent, such as the purpose to defraud, to obstruct legal process, or to influence official action. ("Regulatory offenses" that involve strict liability will be discussed shortly.) In many cases, corporate managers can create fertile conditions for those under their supervision to commit such crimes without intending that crimes be committed. Indeed, though he exerted little effort to make it happen, Brad would no doubt have preferred that his traders return healthy profits and earn lavish bonuses while remaining assiduously within the confines of the law. Loosely speaking, with respect to the wrongdoing and harm, Clara does more and has "more" mens rea than either Albert or Brad. Still, justifying criminal punishment of Clara is problematic-including in ways not as evident in the cases of Albert and Brad.
On the negative side of Clara's ledger, many people are dead as a result of her express directive to her employees, which determined not the specifications but the nature of the car they would build. It is possible to say that Clara did more than omit to prevent the faulty conduct in this case (engineering of the fuel tank). On the dimension of action, Clara's case begins to approach, though not reach, those of the micromanaging CEOs of smaller companies who were convicted for their direct involvement in the shipments of tainted peanuts or the explosion of the coalmine.
It is on mens rea that Clara's case more pointedly raises the problem of the responsibility gap. Her rule of fifteen, elevating form over substance, followed by her lack of interest in knowing how the rule was satisfied-and her management style discouraging reporting of bad news-appear to make her more blameworthy than Brad, who simply paid salespeople on commission, and certainly more blameworthy than Clara, of course, did not act with knowledge or intent with regard to the collision deaths. Indeed, and not to her credit, Clara's management approach virtually guaranteed that she would be unaware of sufficient facts about the automobile to satisfy these demanding mental states. As to recklessness or negligence-whether Clara considered and disregarded death risk or failed to advert to it when she should have-her case is stronger than Albert's and Brad's with respect to specificity of risk. In Albert's case, one had to equate his failure to attend to his entire job with failure to attend to (or his disregard of) the risk of plant explosion. In Brad's case, one had to equate his failure to attend to (or his disregard of) the risk of bonuses incentivizing misconduct with failure to attend to the risk that bonuses would stimulate fraud in the Frankfurt books. And, even then, negligence does not, as we saw, work as a mens rea for fraud. Clara, however, specified limits on the construction of the sedan that necessarily involved risks of fatal accidents due to cheap construction of the car, at least at that level of specificity.
But this brings us to the additional problem with Clara as a case of recklessness or negligence. For either mental state, the risk must have been both substantial and unjustifiable. Cars crash and crashes kill people. This is, at least for now, a fact of the automobile business. Given the size of Clara's industry, even substantial numbers of crashes are justifiable-or we would not build cars and drive them. Clara is also allowed to offer a cheap car on the market. The question of the point at which Clara's "rule" Criminal negligence relatedly requires that the failure to advert to risk constitute a major departure (a "gross deviation") from the conduct of the reasonable person in the actor's situation. The justifiability of the risk and the reasonableness of failing to attend to it are related and overlapping matters. On both scores, the norms of Clara's industry and the complex questions of cost-benefit analysis that govern (or ought to govern) it will have much to say about how to judge her case. This is so with respect to reasonableness not only because reasonableness is generally about norms but also because the reasonableness inquiry in criminal negligence depends in large part on how subjective to make the inquiry, that is, on how much of the actor's individual "situation" to take into account in determining what was reasonable. There are thus two prominent features of the corporate institution that give rise to the problem of the responsibility gap. First, the size and complexity of the large firm mandate division of labor and delegation. Indeed, those are express objectives of the legal and economic concept of the firm, pursued in the name of efficiency. As tasks divide and flow down a corporation's various ladders and ultimately lead to regrettable events, it becomes difficult to assign to those at the top, who initiate the flow of tasks, the sort of legal responsibility with which criminal law is comfortable.
Second, while the matter varies a great deal by industry, risk-taking in the corporate context is, generally speaking, beneficial and encouraged. It is thus much more difficult than in many other contexts for criminal law to specify-and thus to provide reasonable notice of-the degree and types of risk-taking that are clearly enough out of bounds to warrant punishment.
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II. THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE
A. Existing Doctrine
RCO is actual law that seeks to close the responsibility gap-as well as being good evidence that the gap is a real problem, since the doctrine has persisted for decades and is embodied in some federal statutes. 34 As explained by the Supreme Court in the pivotal Park case, liability extends under RCO to "all who had a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws." Park was the CEO of a large 33 Several helpful commenters on drafts of this and related papers have pointed out that these are really "large organization" problems, not strictly corporate problems. This is true. But I focus here on the legal firm (not just public corporations but also nonprofits, partnerships, and so on) because that is the institution that has generated the great majority of calls for legal action when things have gone wrong. The military is another large institution in which problems of managerial responsibility arise with some frequency. The Court admitted and accepted that liability in the case was imposed without regard to culpability and on the basis of mere omission to act. (The rule, the Court said, dispenses with any requirement of "consciousness of wrongdoing." 36 ) The government, it said, makes out its case if it "introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of facts that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and he failed to do so." 37 RCO is fiat. The doctrine sweeps away the problems of action and mental state by dispensing with inquiry into either. The Park Court was explicit in its intention to craft a doctrine-or find that Congress had crafted one-designed to close the responsibility gap: "The requirements of vigilance and foresight imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose services and products affect the health and well-being of the public that supports them." The same is true of two other federal statutory regimes in which strict liability RCO is expressly adopted: the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. 40 Park, the food company CEO, took his case all the way to the Supreme Court after suffering a punishment of a $250 total fine for five counts of conviction. Even still, the Court was careful to allow that RCO permits an excusing defensive claim that the officer was "powerless" to prevent or remedy the relevant violation of law.
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The misdemeanor limitation on RCO is no happenstance. It is traceable to RCO's origins in a group of common law decisions involving criminal misdemeanor liability for matters that look, through a modern lens, quasi-criminal at most. For example, an eighteenth and nineteenth century practice was to grant utility-like rights to companies to build specific turnpikes and railroads by statute, which statutes included misdemeanor penalties-imposed through criminal prosecution-for failure to construct or maintain the thoroughfare as specified. These penalties (fines) could be imposed on the managers and directors of the corporation governed by the statute, sometimes regardless of proof of knowledge of the relevant failure. 
B. Expanding the Doctrine?
We can move quickly to the heart of the matter by dispensing with the idea that this sort of liability could be justified in the absence of any culpability inquiry at all. Serious constitutional questions aside, lengthy imprisonment (perhaps any imprisonment) for failing to prevent another from committing a crime in spite of exercising due care could only be justified by the kind of "even punishing the innocent deters crime" utilitarian reasoning that does not fare well under cost-benefit analysis. Further, that reasoning fails utterly in a system of justification based in part, as ours is, on some version of negative retributivism-roughly, the belief that some requirement of blameworthiness as a condition of punishment at least presumptively constrains the state's power to punish in the cause of crime prevention. This is not quite RCO because it does not hold the manager liable for someone else's offense. It criminalizes the "act" of managing a bank into bankruptcy, specifically an outcome-determinative decision (or failure to stop such a decision) with respect to insolvency. But the statute begins to look a bit like RCO in its idea of a crime of, so to speak, recklessness at the helm.
Even still, the statute is arguably symbolic. The term "financial institution" is defined to include only large and systemically important firms. It will be quite rare for such a firm to land in bankruptcy, rarer still that a specific management decision will be identifiable as having caused that bankruptcy, and even rarer that a prosecutor will pursue such a case and that a jury will arrive at a decision to convict because the conduct fell
"far below what could reasonably be expected." It is doubtful that any UK court will ever send a manager to prison under the authority of this law.
But the statute is informative if taken a bit more seriously. It imposes a kind of recklessness standard: the manager must have considered the risk of failure and his decision to go forward in the face of the risk must have fallen "far below" (i.e., grossly deviated) from the conduct of a reasonable manager in the situation. Both of these elements of the statute's fault standard are confusing. On the first element, when does a manager of a financial firm know that his decisions risk insolvency? Arguably all the time, since some measure of managing a bank profitably and competitively in today's financial markets necessarily requires taking on a degree of leverage that implicates a myriad of risks, not least the risks-the known unknowns-associated with potential global or commodity-specific financial crises. Without more detail, it cannot be said in any coherent way that it is blameworthy for a bank manager to risk insolvency.
A similar problem affects the "far below" element of the statute's fault standard. If chiefs of financial services firms necessarily must run insolvency risks then how much risk is too much to have been reasonable? That will be for a jury to decide, presumably on the basis-one might hope-of a tutorial from dueling experts about how banks are operated. It is hard to imagine how such a tutorial could produce, except in an extravagant case of total mismanagement, the kind of clarity one would want for a criminal conviction.
Consider, for example, the case of JP Morgan's derivatives traders in London, one of whom became known as the infamous "London Whale." 52 Robustly incentivized by a bonus compensation system and determined to solve their own problem in order to avoid management approbation, these traders dug a deeper and deeper hole in their books while concealing the problem by mismarking their positions. The hole reached $1 billion before the facts came out and Morgan had to admit that it had seriously defrauded its own shareholders.
Suppose that admission, contrary to the actual case, had cratered the entire bank and that something like the UK statute applied. Would the top manager of JP Morgan belong in prison because he used financial incentives to encourage his derivatives traders to take risk? Of course not. The banking industry has run on bonusing its salespeople forever.
That decision could not possibly meet the fault standard, nor could some strained substitute, like a failure by the CEO to decide at some point to institute a more onerous system of controls on how traders across the massive bank mark their books.
The two central problems here are not specific to the UK statute's approach or to the banking industry. The first problem is the application of the risk inquiry involved in criminal recklessness and negligence to contexts in which our corporate-capitalist economic and social order has placed a high value on the benefits of the relevant activity.
Corporate crime is not Russian roulette, or drag racing, or drunk driving, or angry fights inside homes or outside bars. It is embedded in economic activities-making food and medicine, manufacturing cars, extracting energy resources, providing credit and investment opportunities-that are both highly valued and necessarily entail risks, financial and physical.
The problem of risk specification is not entirely hopeless. To return to our example cases, one can see a path to criminal recklessness findings if Albert had been told, the day before his golfing and scotch hiatus, that the equipment for handling compound X was wearing out and at peril of immediate failure; if Brad's bank had a series of cases in which his bonus compensation system led directly to traders fraudulently mismarking their books and Brad nonetheless pressed ahead with the same compensation system; or if Clara had been told that her "rule of fifteen" could only be satisfied by using a fuel tank that might not be safe and she said to build the car anyway.
These are quite likely reckless CEOs. But, with additional facts like these tying them down to the harm, they also begin to look more like those who have been convicted in the smaller company cases-the peanut CEO who said "ship it," the coal CEO who micromanaged the handling of safety processes, and the egg company bosses whose facilities were infested with contaminants. It is fair to say that those who manage a company such a BP have undertaken a duty not to egregiously pollute the oceans. We need not specify for present purposes the various potential sources of that duty in contract law, corporate law, environmental regulation, and tort law. Suffice it to say that the CEO of a petroleum company has a duty to do something like "extract oil at a profit without violating the law."
The complication is not so much in describing the duty as it is in specifying how one 
III. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Criminalizing the corporation is another way to come at the responsibility gap.
Utilitarian supporters of corporate criminal liability argue that the threat of criminal sanctions against the firm-coupled with some system that credits self-policingencourages directors and officers of corporations to use management policies and practices to discourage crime by employees, principally by raising the probability of sanction through effective compliance programs that include reporting violators to the 53 This is, I believe, an implementation problem that presents a fundamental obstacle even if one is prepared to cross the initial threshold of arguing that the dangerousness and accompanying benefits of industrial activities justify imposing criminal negligence liability, and perhaps even placing the burden of proof of due care, on corporate officers. imposed on managers, no matter how factually, if not legally, responsible they may be for the corporate crime. The lack of individual sanction is conceded by the utilitarians to be a problem because many managers may have too much appetite for risk, willing to take greater chances with the firm's survival than is in the shareholder's interest. 60 In the end and after all, even the manager who presides over the worst sort of catastrophe, the one that leaves many deaths behind, walks away from the imposition of corporate criminal liability personally unmolested by police, prosecutors, or courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
To review, the large modern corporation produces, among other things, a particular paradigm case of no action, no mental state, and high responsibility. Thus we have the responsibility gap.
The inability of RCO, and especially expanded conceptions of RCO, to make a persuasive case for closing the responsibility gap tells us something about that gap.
Criminal law is a poor tool for managing the institution of the large modern business firm. (Criminal law may be a poor tool for managing institutions generally, but that is a broader discussion.) This is true whether we take criminal law as we find it, in which case doctrines for closing the gap simply are not there. Or whether we discuss "reforming" criminal law to include new doctrines for closing the gap, which then do not fare well under the justificatory structure of the criminal law.
The problem is the firm. It is the scale of the large corporation, the necessity of delegation and division of responsibility to the process of "team production," and even the founding principle of limited liability (and thus limited personal responsibility) that are both structural to the firm and that guarantee inevitable separation between action and responsibility. Criminal law, which paramount among all bodies of law is structured around the individual, cannot be plausibly molded around the firm-at least not when the prime objective is responsibility ascription and punishment rather than the production of incentives to alter behavior. Whether the law targets senior managers or the firm itself, it is engaged in a futile quest to humanize and individualize something that is an institution and a system. The mismatch is plain and unavoidable.
A backward-looking orientation thus seems unpromising for responding to the repeating problem of wrongdoing within the corporation. Rather than trying to close the responsibility gap ex post through punishment, we might think more deeply about how to change the structure of responsibility ex ante-about how to get people to exercise responsibility rather than about how to impose it upon them.
This leads to a subject quite beyond the topic of this symposium, of course. So let us conclude by naming those areas of inquiry that might be more promising than a program for expanding criminal liability along the lines of RCO.
Responsibility is a matter, at least, of both capacity and commitment. Increasing capacity, I believe, means ensuring that the scale and complexity of the business firm do not extend beyond the ability of one or a few humans to handle them. Perhaps, then, if we wish to reduce the incidence of large-scale corporate malfeasance, we need a rethinking of the basic structure of corporate markets, along the lines of the movement at the turn of the twentieth century that produced antitrust law and related forms of regulation.
Commitment can be promoted in a number of ways. Certainly more effective and directed regulation of industries that involve routine and serious risks is likely to focus management attention on preventing the worst of problems. Maybe what is needed, depending on the industry of course, is not so much more regulation as better enforcement of regulation. The routine and predictable visit of the inspector might be a better mechanism for heightening management attention than the very occasional, and sometimes overly discounted, prospect of the prosecutor's arrival. Even before the involvement of inspectors, regulatory regimes could be enhanced to require more documentation of senior management involvement in review of facts and approval of decisions-a method, if not to deter wrongdoing in the first instance, perhaps to transform some of the cases of management detachment from the wrongdoing into cases of more direct, provable management involvement.
Corporate governance is also a subject that our recent experiences with the large modern firm suggest might benefit from some deeper rethinking. There is an emerging literature about executive compensation as a matter that needs redesign and that might be a promising tool for enhancing the commitment of managers to controlling the most potentially damaging kinds of risk. 61 Much of the recent literature about the basic rules of the corporate road-the terms of the corporate charter, the relationship between the firm and the state, the legal duties and liabilities of corporate officers and directors-is engaged in an exercise of tinkering to optimize existing regimes. 62 Those regimes, which remain oddly tethered to state law in just a few leading "markets for incorporation," and the professional discussions about them, appear increasingly detached from the experience of the contemporary citizen with the large American corporation and its presence on the ground of daily life. Among institutions of this age, the corporation has been far from under-theorized. But perhaps that body of theory has been too successful over time and now interferes with our ability to see where it needs a more basic rethinking. Corporate crime, on this view, is not nearly so much an interesting subculture within the sociology and law of crime-at it tends to be treated in
